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Mushabib al-Hamlan
This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. Category:Content Lead An original candidate in the September 11, 2001 attack, '''Mushabib al-Hamlan' (Musḥabīb al-Ḥamlān) became involved with militancy at secondary-school in December 1999, where he attended gatherings to watch videos about the glory of Jihad and detailing the atrocities of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the . The group studied under and read the book . On February 15th 2000, Hamlan received a passport, and after completing the , went to to obtain a Visa for entering Pakistan. Once in , he and two co-travelers were led by Hassan Ghul to a waypoint controlled by . By March, they had crossed the border into Afghanistan where he attended the Al Khaldan training camp.911 Commission: Notes to Chapter 7, 911 Commission When the camp was closed, he moved with its other members to Al-Farouq outside , where he met Osama bin Laden.911 Commission: Notes to Chapter 7, 911 Commission After injuring himself at the camp, Hamlan was assigned to guard the - a task that eventual hijackers Saeed al-Ghamdi and Waleed al-Shehri shared. During his time at Al-Farooq and the airport, Hamlan is thought to have befriended Ahmed al-Nami. The two of them studied under Abu Basir al-Yemeni, who coaxed them both to enlist with Abu Hafs al Mauritani as potential 'martyrs' who would carry out suicide missions inside the United States. Hamlan and al-Nami were sent to meet Osama bin Laden, identifying themselves through the phrase I want to be one of this religion's bricks and glorify this religion. In October 2000, Hamlan and al-Nami met with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed who instructed them on encrypting telephone calls. They also had their passports falsified claiming they were world travellers visiting locations such as Singapore, Malaysia, Egypt and Turkey. After a meeting with Muhammad Atef, the pair flew to Tehran, Iran - onward to Qatar - back into the before arriving in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. On instructions from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, they drove to Jeddah, where they stayed with future hijacker Waleed al-Shehri. He also instructed them how to obtain US visas, which both received on October 28th. In the end Mushabib did not end up using his visa.9/11 panel describes how attackers got money: New details on hijackers' visa, immigration violations, CNN Immediately after they were issued their visas, Hamlan phoned his family and learned that his mother was ill. He then decided not to pursue martyrdom and returned to his family. Khalid al Zahrani, an associate from Al-Farouq visited him later to try and convince him to return, but failed.911 Commission: Notes to Chapter 7, 911 Commission Timeline Summer 2000: Some 9/11 Hijackers Allegedly Work as Airport Security Staff in Afghanistan Under interrogation after 9/11, al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash will claim he met some of the 9/11 hijackers at Kandahar airport in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000. Although he will not be able to recall all of them, he will say the group includes Satam Al Suqami, Waleed and Wail Alshehri, Abdulaziz Alomari, Hamza Alghamdi, Salem Alhazmi, and Majed Moqed. He will say he was closest to Saeed Alghamdi, whom he convinced to become a martyr and whom he asked to recruit a friend, Ahmed Alghamdi, to the same cause. However, doubts will later be expressed about the reliability of such statements from prisoners like bin Attash, due to the methods used to obtain them (see June 16, 2004) COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 233-4 Al-Qaeda’s division of passports and host country issues is based at the airport and it alters passports, visas and identification cards. Some people involved in the plot will later be reported to have altered travel documents (see July 23, 2001). COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 56 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami and would-be hijacker Mushabib al-Hamlan are also said to be at the same Kandahar camp, Al Farooq, and are assigned to guard the airport. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 526 By the late 1990s, the Kandahar airport will become the main logistics lifeline for al-Qaeda and the Taliban to the outside world. One Ariana pilot will later recall, “I would see Arabs with satellite phones walking around the terminal, in touch with the Taliban at the highest levels.” On one occasion, he sees Taliban ruler Mullah Omar meeting in the middle of the airport with a rebel leader from Tajikistan, surrounded by aides. “There they were, cross-legged on their mats, chattering into cell phones.” AND BRAUN, 2007, PP. 140 At this time, the Kandahar airport is being mainly used by Ariana Airlines, which has been completely co-opted by al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and aircraft companies controlled by international arms dealer Victor Bout (see 1998). Entity Tags: Wail Alshehri, Waleed M. Alshehri, Mullah Omar, Tawfiq bin Attash, Ariana Airlines, Salem Alhazmi, Satam Al Suqami, Ahmed Alnami, Ahmed Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Saeed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, Mushabib al-Hamlan, Hamza Alghamdi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline October 28, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Obtains US Visa despite Incomplete Application and Suspicious Indicators Future 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami and candidate hijacker Mushabib al-Hamlan obtain US visas from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 14-15 Alnami’s visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000) and will issue Alnami with a second visa next year (see April 23, 2001). COMMISSION, 12/30/2002, PP. 2; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE), 1/30/2003 Alnami’s application is incomplete, as he lists his occupation as “student,” but does not provide a complete address for his school. He also gives his US address as “in Los Angeles” and writes that “my friend Moshibab” will be traveling with him. The 9/11 Commission will later suggest that Alnami’s passport may contain fraudulent travel stamps associated with al-Qaeda, although this is not certain and is apparently not noticed at this time. COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 14-15 The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alnami’s passports may contain a suspicious indicator of Islamist extremism, but this is not certain (see November 6, 1999 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 563-4; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 14-15 Before obtaining the visa, Alnami and al-Hamlan followed instructions given them by al-Qaeda leaders Mohammed Atef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and contacted future 9/11 hijacker Waleed Alshehri in Jeddah. They briefly share an apartment with Alshehri, who provides them with directions to the consulate and shows them how to fill out visa applications. Al-Hamlan will soon drop out of the plot after contacting his family. Alnami will later be said to fly to Beirut with the Alshehris (see Mid-November, 2000). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 526 Entity Tags: Shayna Steinger, Mushabib al-Hamlan, 9/11 Commission, US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office, Waleed M. Alshehri, Ahmed Alnami Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline References Category:people Hamlan Category:People associated with the September 11 attacks